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Distributed Management of OMA DRM Domains
Harikrishna Vasanta Reihaneh Safavi-Naini
Nicholas Paul Sheppard Jan Martin Surminen
Abstract
Version 2.0 of the Open Mobile Alliance’s Digital Rights Management Speci-
fication provides for protected content to be shared amongst a collection of devices
in a domain. Domains are created and managed directly by the rights issuer that
issues rights to the domain. In this paper, we propose to devolve the management
of domains to a domain manager known asHeimdallthat acts as a broker between
the devices in an authorised domain and any content providers from which content
for the domain can be sourced. We describe and compare three different modes in
which Heimdall might operate.
1 Introduction
Digital rights management (DRM) systems are used to control the use and distribu-
tion of copyrighted content. Copyright owners’ fears of financial losses caused by
widespread copyright infringement have seen digital rights management become a very
active field of research over the past decade.
Early digital rights management systems worked by protecting content in such a
way as to render it usable on only one device. In real life, a group of users who share
similar interests might like to access content as a group, and individual users would
like to access content using any of the devices that they own. The users would like to
obtain content from multiple rights issuers.
Recognising this, numerous DRM systems have been proposed that support the
concept of anauthorised domain[1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10]. An authorised domain is a group of
devices that may share access to a pool of content that has been granted to that domain.
A typical authorised domain, for example, may consist of all of the devices within one
household.
The Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) is an organisation that specifies mobile ser-
vice enablers that ensure service interoperability across devices, geographies, service
providers, operators, and networks. Of particular interest to this paper, OMA has re-
cently approved the enabler for OMA DRM Version 2.0 [8], which specifies a digital
rights management system for use with mobile phones.
The OMA DRM system consists of
• rights issuers(RIs) who are responsible for (1) providingrights objects(ROs)
that permit access to protected content and (2) managing domains within which
ROs may be shared; and
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Figure 1: OMA DRM domain system.
• DRM agentsthat permit users to consume protected content according to the
rights specified in ROs.
Figure 1 shows a domain containing three devices.
The base OMA specification requires that devices interact individually with every
RI from which they wish to obtain content. In this paper, we propose to introduce a
broker between a domain and an arbitrary number of RIs that
• relieves RIs from interacting with every domain member individually;
• provides a single sign-on point through which user devices can access all of the
content to which they are entitled; and
• provides a caching service that reduces the level of traffic between RIs and user
devices.
Architectures of this kind can also be used to provide inter-operability between devices
and right issuers supporting a number of different digital rights management regimes
[4], but in this paper we only consider the OMA DRM regime.
In order to introduce the broker, we separate the function of the RI into two com-
ponents:
• the functional responsibilitiesof creating domains and providing ROs for the
domain; and
• the group management responsibilitiesof admitting devices to and removing
devices from the domain.
Functional responsibilities will remain with the RI but group management responsibil-
ities will be devolved to the broker.
We call the brokerHeimdall, after the Norse deity charged with guarding the bridge
that links the realm of the gods with the realm of humans. Our Heimdall is a software
application or hardware device that interacts with RIs on one hand and the user devices
in a domain on the other, as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Our proposed domain management system.
A stand-alone instance of Heimdall may be installed at a location shared by the
domain members, or Heimdall may be implemented as a service by network carriers.
Heimdall is registered to all of the rights issuers that the domain members wish to
use, and thereafter all communication between users’ devices and the rights issuers is
conducted via Heimdall.
1.1 Paper Organisation
We will give a description of the OMA DRM Version 2.0 specification in Section 2. We
will then describe and analyse three different modes in which Heimdall might operate,
with increasing degrees of responsibility placed on Heimdall:
• as a simple relay in Section 3;
• as a member of the domain in Section 4; or
• as a rights issuer in its own right in Section 5.
We describe how each mode can be implemented using the OMA RO Acquistion Pro-
tocol suite, and argue that the security properties of the new system are equivalent to
those of the base OMA specification.
We will then give a comparison of the three modes and discuss Heimdall’s rela-
tionship with other domain management frameworks in Section 6. Finally, we will
conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 OMA DRM
2.1 Security Model
The security of the OMA DRM system depends on DRM agents being certified by the
Content Management License Administrator (CMLA) [2] to meet tamper-resistance
requirements specified by OMA. These requirements are designed to prevent dishonest
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users from extracting unprotected content, decryption keys or devices’ private keys
from devices. Every certified device has a unique private/public key pair.
Protected content is distributed in an encrypted format called theDRM Content For-
mat (DCF). Each DCF file is encrypted using a randomcontent encryption key(CEK)
and can be freely distributed using any convenient method. The content encryption key
is included in any RO that awards permission to use the associated content, and the
sensitive parts of the RO (including the CEK) are encrypted using ari hts encryption
key(REK). The REK for an RO must be obtained from the RI that issued that RO us-
ing the Rights Object Acquisition Protocol (ROAP), which will be described in detail
below.
In addition to the supplying the CEK, the RO sets out what the recipient device is
permitted to do with the content (play, install, etc.) and under what constraints the the
content may be used (the number of times it may be played, etc.). In this paper, we are
only concerned with the cryptographic components of ROs.
The integrity of an RO is protected by having it signed by the RI that issued it. A
DRM agent must obtain the RI’s certificate chain using ROAP messages and verify the
RI’s signature before using an RO. This prevents dishonest users from modifying ROs
in order to grant themselves permissions that have not been granted by a recognised
RI.
2.2 Domains
OMA DRM uses the concept of adomainto share content among a group of users.
Domains are created by an RI, and DRM agents may join or leave a domain by making
a request to the RI that created the domain. ROs intended for the domain are encrypted
using an REK itself encrypted with adomain keythat is unique for that domain. A
DRM agent receives the domain key upon joining a domain, and deletes it after leaving
a domain, using protocols described below.
2.3 ROAP Messages
OMA DRM specifies four protocols for obtaining ROs and managing domains. All of
the protocols are executed between an RI and a DRM agent. Every protocol may be
initiated by a DRM agent, or an RI can request that a DRM agent begin the protocol by
sending it atrigger. A typical sequence of messages is shown in Figure 3.
Registration. Before a DRM agent can process ROs issued by some RI, it must ex-
ecute theRegistration Protocolwith that RI. This protocol allows the RI and
DRM agent to exchange parameters; the RI to verify that the DRM agent has
been certified by the CMLA; and the device to request that the RI prove that its
certificate chain is still valid using the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
[7].
Join Domain. The Join Domain Protocol is used to join a device to a domain after it
has been registered to the RI that controls that domain. After a successful run of
the protocol, the client will have the domain key.
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Rights Object Acquisiton. The Rights Object Acquisition Protocol enables DRM agents
to obtain rights objects from an RI for content that has been protected by that RI.
After successfully completing the protocol, the DRM agent has the RO required
to use the content and the REK for that RO.
Leave Domain. A DRM agent can leave a domain by deleting all of the information
associated with that domain (including the domain key) and initiating the Leave
Domain Protocol with the RI.
In the Heimdall framework, Join Domain, RO Acquisition and Leave Domain re-
quests will be processed by Heimdall as a proxy for RIs. In the mode described by
Section 5, Heimdall will also process registration requests.
2.4 Security Goals
The goal of an attacker in a DRM system is to exercise rights over content that have
not been granted by a legitimate rights issuer, that is, to perform an action that is not
permitted by any valid rights object.
The OMA DRM specification analyses various attacks that can be mounted on the
DRM system. The specification assumes that an adversary is able to:
• listen to the communication channels between the DRM agent and RI; and
• read, modify, remove, generate and inject messages in this channel.
We will require our Heimdall framework to meet the same requirements for defeating
these attacks as the base OMA system.
3 Option 1: Heimdall as a Relay
In the first approach, Heimdall simply acts as a relay. Heimdall does not have access to
the domain key or the decrypted ROs at any time, and therefore does not need to meet
high tamper-resistance requirements. RIs are responsible for creating domains and
providing ROs to devices in the domain, as well as creating the Join Domain and Leave
Domain responses for each device in a domain. An example sequence of messages is
shown in Figure 8.
3.0.1 Initialisation.
Devices use the Registration Protocol to register directly with any RI they wish to use
prior to the initialisation of Heimdall. Users wishing to form a domain must commu-
nicate the proposed members of the domain to the RI, and supply the identity of the
instance of Heimdall that they wish to use for managing the domain. If the domain is
successfully created, the RI provides Heimdall with the response to a Join Domain re-
quest for each of the devices in the proposed domain, as if that device had requested to
join the domain. These responses will later be forwarded to devices when they transmit
a Join Domain request to Heimdall. Note that Heimdall must be initialised separately
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RI Device
 Device Hello
-RI Hello
 Registration Request
-Registration Response
 Join Request
-Join Response
 RO Request
-RO Response
etc.
 Leave Request
-Leave Response
Figure 3: A typical sequence of messages in an OMA domain. Each shaded box de-
notes a protocol defined by OMA.
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Device Hello: ROAP Version, Device ID, Supported
Algorithms, Extensions
RI Hello: Status, Session ID, ROAP Version,
RI ID, Selected Algorithms RI Nonce,
Authorities, Server Info., Extensions
Registration Request: Session ID, Device Nonce, Request
Time, Cert. Chain, Authorities,
Server Info., Extensions, Signature
Registration Response:Status, Session ID, RI URL, Cert.
Chain, OCSP Resp., Extensions,
Signature
Figure 4: OMA Registration Protocol. The signatures in the request and response
messages are over all data transmitted so far in the protocol.
Join Domain Request: Device ID, RI ID, Device Nonce,
Request Time, Domain ID, Cert.
Chain, Extensions, Signature
Join Domain Response:Status, Device ID, RI ID, Device
Nonce, Domain Info., Cert. Chain,
OCSP Resp., Extensions, Signature
Figure 5: OMA Join Domain Protocol.
RO Request: Device ID, Domain ID, RI ID, Device
Nonce, Request Time, RO Info, Cert.
Chain, Extensions, Signature
RO Response: Status, Device ID, RI ID, Device
Nonce, Protected ROs, Cert. Chain,
OCSP Resp., Extensions, Signature
Figure 6: OMA RO Acquisition Protocol.
Leave Domain Request: Device ID, RI ID, Device Nonce,
Request Time, Domain ID, Cert.
Chain, Extensions, Signature
Leave Domain Response:Status, Device Nonce, Domain ID,
Extensions
Figure 7: OMA Leave Domain Protocol.
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(a)
RI
Heimdall
Device
 -Registration Protocol
 Init. Req.
-Init. Resp.
-Join Trigger
 Join Request
-Join Response
 -RO Acquisition  -RO Acquisition
 Leave Request
-Leave Response
(b)
RI Heimdall Dev. 1
Dev. 2
 RO Request
 RO Request
-RO Response
-RO Response
 RO Request
-RO Response
Figure 8: (a) Creating, joining and leaving a domain in Option 1 and (b) acquiring a
rights object.
for every domain that it manages in order to obtain the appropriate Join Domain re-
sponses for that domain, even if those domains are created by the same RI.
3.0.2 Joining Domains.
After Heimdall has been initialised for a domain, it sends a Join Domain Trigger to
all of the devices enrolled with the RI to be in this domain. The devices then join the
domain by completing the Join Domain Protocol with Heimdall, which uses the pre-
prepared responses that it received from the RI. Completion of this protocol gives the
devices access to the domain key.
3.0.3 RO Acquisition.
Once devices have joined the domain, they can request ROs for the domain from Heim-
dall. If Heimdall has the desired RO, it provides this RO to the device. Otherwise,
Heimdall forwards the request to the RI and obtains the RO Response. It forwards the
RO Response to the requesting device, and stores a copy itself in order to serve any
future requests for the same RO.
3.0.4 Leaving Domains.
Devices can leave a domain by executing the Leave Domain Protocol with Heimdall.
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3.1 Security
Device registration in this mode is identical to that used in the base OMA specification
and so obviously has the same security properties.
The OMA specification requires nonces to be used in request/response pairs in
order to prove that the RI is “live”, that is, responses are being computed in response
to a particular request and not being replayed from storage. Caching the Join Domain
and RO Responses on Heimdall obviously breaks this requirement, and standard OMA
devices will reject forwarded Join Domain and RO Response messages because their
nonces do not match. In the remainder of this section, we will assume the use of non-
standard devices that do not respect the nonce but otherwise behave as normal OMA
devices.
Since devices have been pre-approved for joining the domain during the initialisa-
tion phase, replaying the Join Domain Response will not gain an attacker any privileges
that he or she didn’t have already. If Heimdall or an RI wishes to begin refusing permis-
sion for a device to enter a domain, however, adomain upgrademust be performed.
This procedure is defined by OMA and allows a compromised domain key to be re-
newed by requiring legitimate devices to re-join the domain in order to receive a new
domain key. In the present context, this means re-initialising Heimdall.
OMA provides protection against replay attacks on ROs separately from the acqui-
sition protocol. ROs containing usage constraints that require state information (such
as a counter or meter) to be kept must have globally unique identifiers and devices
must securely store the identifiers of any such ROs that they have been given. If a
purportedly new RO arrives with the same identifier as one that has already been seen
by the device, the new RO must be rejected. ROs without stateful constraints can be
replayed without any affect on the security of the system. Any replay attack on the
RO Acquisition Protocol, therefore, will be caught by the devices’ replay protection
system.
Aside from the foregoing observation about liveness, it is is easy to see that Heim-
dall in this mode simply forms a channel between the RI and devices that is no different
from the usual channel between the RI and devices. The security properties of OMA’s
messages are therefore unchanged in this mode.
4 Option 2: Heimdall as a Domain Member
In this method, we will allow Heimdall to have access to the domain key; that is,
Heimdall is itself a member of the domain. Heimdall is then able to provide the domain
key to a user device by encrypting the domain key with the public key of this device.
An example sequence of messages using this option is shown in Figure 9.
The main advantage of this method is that during the joining of the domain, RIs
need not be responsible for encrypting the domain key with the public key of the user
device. However, we now require that Heimdall meet OMA’s tamper-resistance stan-
dard since it has the domain key and has the ability to decrypt ROs obtained from RIs.
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(a)
RI
Heimdall
Device
 -Registration Protocol
 -Registration
 Join Request
-Join Response
 Join Request
-Join Response
 -RO Acquisition  -RO Acquisition
 Leave Request
-Leave Response
(b)
RI Heimdall Dev. 1
Dev. 2
 RO Request
 RO Request
-RO Response
-RO Response
 RO Request
-RO Response
Figure 9: (a) Creating, joining and leaving domains for Option 2 and (b) acquiring a
rights object.
4.0.1 Initialisation.
Devices are registered directly with RIs using the Registration Protocol. Heimdall is
then registered using the same protocol, and the list of devices that have enrolled with
the RI for this domain is passed to Heimdall in theExtensionsfield of the Registration
Response. Heimdall then executes the Join Domain Protocol with the RI in order to
obtain the domain key.
4.0.2 Joining Domains.
Devices join a domain by executing the Join Domain Protocol with Heimdall as shown
in Figure 10. Heimdall verifies the identity of the device using the registration details
provided by the RI, and constructs a positive Join Domain Response by encrypting
the domain key with public key of the requesting device. The original Join Domain
Response obtained by Heimdall from the RI is appended to theExt nsionsfield of the
new message, and the message is signed by Heimdall before returning the response to
the device.
4.0.3 RO Acquisition.
Devices may acquire ROs by executing the RO Acquisition Protocol with Heimdall as
shown in Fig. 11. If Heimdall does not have a copy of the requested RO, it obtains it
from the RI using the normal RO Acquisition Protocol and caches it as in Option 1.
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Heimdall→ RI: Heimdall ID, RI ID, Heimdall Nonce,
Request Time, Domain ID, Heimdall
Cert. Chain, Extensions, Heimdall
Signature
RI→ Heimdall: Status, Heimdall ID, RI ID, Heimdall
Nonce, Domain Info. RI Cert. Chain,
RI OCSP Resp., Extensions, RI
Signature
Device→ Heimdall: Device ID, RI ID, Device Nonce,
Request Time, Domain ID, Device Cert.
Chain, Extensions, Device Signature
Heimdall→ Device: Status, Device ID, RI ID, Device
Nonce, Re-encrypted Domain Info.,
Heimdall Cert. Chain, Heimdall
OCSP Resp., RI Response, Heimdall
Signature
Figure 10: Option 2 Join Domain Protocol, including the initial joining of Heimdall to
the domain.
Heimdall replaces the device nonce in the RO Response from the RI with the device
nonce supplied by the requesting device, and appends the original RO Response to
the extensions field of the re-written message. Heimdall then replaces the the RI’s
certificate chain and signature with its own and forwards the re-written response to the
device.
4.0.4 Leaving Domains.
The devices leave the domain by executing the OMA Leave Domain Protocol with
Heimdall.
4.1 Security
Device registration is identical to that used in the base OMA specification. The initial
execution of the Join Domain Protocol between Heimdall and the RI is identical to the
standard procedure for joining a device to a domain.
Given that Heimdall is trusted to check requests to join a domain against the list
of devices supplied by the original RI, it is not possible for a device to join a domain
unless it has been approved by the RI. This is the same as the base OMA specification.
Theoretically, devices can establish trust in Heimdall by following the certificate
chain provided in the re-written Join Domain and RO Responses. Given that the device
trusts Heimdall, it can be assured that the response was approved by a genuine RI.
Devices can also check the original response by examining the extensions field of the
re-written response.
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Device→ Heimdall: Device ID, Domain ID, RI ID, Device
Nonce, Request Time, RO Info, Device
Cert. Chain, Extensions, Device
Signature
Heimdall→ RI: Heimdall ID, Domain ID, RI ID,
Heimdall Nonce, Request Time,
RO Info, Heimdall Cert. Chain,
Extensions, Heimdall Signature
RI→ Heimdall: Status, Heimdall ID, RI ID, Heimdall
Nonce, Protected ROs, RI Cert.
Chain, RI OCSP Resp., Extensions, RI
Signature
Heimdall→ Device: Status, Device ID, RI ID, Device
None, Protected ROs, Heimdall Cert.
Chain, Heimdall OCSP Resp., RI
Response, Heimdall Signature
Figure 11: Option 2 RO Acquisition Protocol
Standard OMA devices, however, may expect to find the certificate chain of the
original RI in the responses and be confused by finding Heimdall’s instead. The exact
behaviour of a device may vary from implementation to implementation since the OMA
specification does not specifically consider the case in which a valid certificate chain is
provided, but is for a different entity than the one that originally issued the RO.
5 Option 3: Heimdall as a Rights Issuer
In this method we extend the responsibilities of Heimdall to registration of devices on
behalf of the RI. This reduces the amount of traffic between Heimdall and the RI. An
example sequence of messages using this option is shown in Figure 12. In this method,
the RI and the user devices cannot authenticate each other directly and thus have to
completely trust Heimdall.
5.0.1 Initialisation.
Devices are registered with Heimdall using the Registration Protocol. Heimdall regis-
ters with any RI it wishes to use using the Registration Protocol, and at the same time
it provides the details of all of the devices registered to it so that the RI can charge the
users accordingly. Heimdall then joins a domain and obtains the domain key from the
RI that created the domain using the Join Domain Protocol as normal.
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(a)
RI Heimdall Device
 -Registration
 -Registration
 Join Request
-Join Response
 Join Request
-Join Response
 -RO Acquisition  -RO Acquisition
 Leave Request
-Leave Response
(b)
RI Heimdall Dev. 1
Dev. 2
 RO Request
 RO Request
-RO Response
-RO Response
 RO Request
-RO Response
Figure 12: (a) Creating, joining and leaving domains for Option 3 and (b) acquiring a
rights object.
5.0.2 Joining Domains.
Devices join the domain by executing the Join Domain Protocol with Heimdall. As in
Option 2, Heimdall re-encrypts the domain key using the public key of the incoming
device, and transmits this to the device using the Join Domain Response message as if
Heimdall were a normal RI.
5.0.3 RO Acquisition.
User devices request and obtain content and ROs from Heimdall using a similar process
to that used in Option 2. Heimdall obtains ROs from the original RI by executing the
RO Acquisition Protocol as if it were a normal OMA device. Heimdall then replaces
the RI’s signature on the RO with its own signature, which is recognised by the devices
that have registered with Heimdall. Devices that have registered to Heimdall can then
obtain the RO by executing the RO Acquisition Protocol with Heimdall as if it were a
normal OMA RI.
5.0.4 Leaving Domains.
Devices leave the domain by executing the Leave Domain Protocol with Heimdall.
5.1 Security
The relationship between Heimdall and user devices in this mode is identical to that
between the RI and user devices in the base OMA specification. If Heimdall behaves
identically to the original RI given the same input, it is easy to see that the system has
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OMA DRM Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Heimdall tamper-resistance No No Yes Yes
Heimdall domain policy No No No Yes
Heimdall load None Storage Re-write Total
RI load Total RO issue RO issue RO issue
Latency None Low High High
OMA Compliant Yes No Unclear Yes
Table 1: Comparison between OMA DRM and the three options discussed here.
identical security properties to those of the base OMA specification. To ensure this,
it is necessary to assume that Heimdall has access to the domain membership policy
supported by the RI, cf. [3].
If all domains have the same policy for admitting members (e.g. “at mostn devices
may be in the domain at any one time”), this policy can be coded into Heimdall at the
time it is manufactured. If RIs support more than one kind of domain policy, the RI
must communicate its policy to Heimdall as part of theExtensionsfield in the initial
Join Domain Response sent to Heimdall.
Given that Heimdall is trusted to follow the domain policy, it is easy to see that it
will behave exactly like the original RI and the domain will operate exactly as if it were
managed directly by the RI.
6 Discussion
Table 1 gives a summary of the features of each of the three options we have discussed,
and compares these (where applicable) to the original OMA DRM system. We sum-
marise
• whether or not Heimdall is required to be tamper-resistant
• whether or not Heimdall is required to implement a domain policy
• the computational load placed on Heimdall;
• the computational load placed on the RI;
• the increase in latency caused by inserting the intermediary; and
• whether or not the mode can support standard OMA devices.
6.1 Other Domain Management Frameworks
The notion of a domain manager is also used in authorised domain frameworks pro-
posed by Koster, et al. [3], Popescu, et al. [10] and Marlin [5]. The systems pro-
posed by Koster, et al. and Popescu, et al. provide broadly similar functionality to
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that provided by the Heimdall framework, but are not implemented within a standard-
ised framework such as OMA. The Marlin specification was not available for public
discussion at the time of writing.
The authorised domain frameworks proposed by Thomson [1] and the TIRAMISU
Project [6] distribute the domain key to domain members by use of smartcards. The
xCP framework proposed by IBM [9] is similar in that no nominated domain manager
is required, but domain members distribute the domain key amongst themselves using
a peer-to-peer protocol. These frameworks, however, are designed to support only
household-type domains and it is not clear how well they would scale to larger domains.
7 Conclusion
We have describedHeimdall, a domain management system for interacting with mul-
tiple RIs. The proposed framework provides the ability for users to join the domain,
obtain content, transfer content between domain members and leave the domain. The
introduction of Heimdall reduces the amount of computation performed by RIs, and
reduces and the traffic between user devices and RIs.
We have compared the trade-offs made in three different modes in which Heimdall
could operate, and shown that each mode can implemented so as to have the same
security properties as the base OMA specification.
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